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ABSTRACT 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a series of U.S. 
Supreme Court cases have secured the right to counsel for 
defendants facing incarceration.  Neither the Sixth Amendment nor 
the Supreme Court cases, however, provide guidance on how 
eligibility for court-appointed counsel should be determined.  This 
Article analyzes state statutes to determine the extent to which 
state legislatures have enacted statutory guidance regarding how 
decisions for court-appointed counsel are made.  Results indicate 
that legislative direction for eligibility decisions varies widely, and 
many statutes lack objective eligibility criteria.  The Article 
concludes that leaving broad discretion to state judges presents 
risks for abuse and threats to defendants’ rights. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel provision has been a part of 
American constitutional law since 1791, but it was not originally interpreted to 
give government-subsidized counsel to those who could not afford it.3  While 
twelve of the original thirteen United States colonies recognized a defendant’s 
right to counsel in serious cases, rejecting English common law,4 the 
“protections” afforded by these colonies were not always applied in a manner that 
ensured a defendant’s rights were adequately safeguarded.5  In fact, the practical 
implications of the right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants did not 
emerge until the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Powell v. Alabama in 
                                                
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1932).    
5 Id. at 60.  Justice Sutherland wrote that in an obvious “perversion of all sense of proportion,” 
English common law rule dictated that defendants facing less serious, misdemeanor offenses were 
entitled to the “full assistance of counsel,” while those charged with treason or another felony 
were denied that assistance.  Id.    
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1932.6  With the Powell decision, the Court opened the door for more meaningful 
right to counsel protections by incorporating the Sixth Amendment through the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.7  This decision 
secured the right to counsel for defendants accused of capital crimes in state and 
federal proceedings.  This right would then grow over the next thirty years during 
which the Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright 8 and Argersinger v. Hamlin.9  
These cases, together with others, secured the right to counsel for all criminal 
defendants facing potential loss of liberty. 
Despite these critical judicial decisions that changed the theoretical 
landscape of procedural justice in this country, the Court has never provided 
practical guidance regarding how the right to counsel should be institutionalized.  
The work of fleshing out the detail regarding how, when, and for whom the right 
should be afforded has been left to the federal and state legislatures and lower 
courts.  Absent additional guidance from the Supreme Court or other central 
authority, the determination of indigency has been left in the hands of the states, 
and while states use some of the same factors in that determination, no two states 
employ exactly the same criteria.  It, therefore, would be a “gross over-
generalization” to say that there is one typical system employed by a majority of 
states to determine indigency.10  A review of the extant literature regarding the 
right to counsel suggests that some jurisdictions have had more success than 
others in implementing and maintaining indigent defense systems.11  The 
literature reveals that, today, more than five decades after the Supreme Court’s 
landmark ruling in Gideon v. Wainright, the nation’s indigent defense systems are 
in a state of crisis due, in large part, to heavy caseloads and severe under-
funding.12  State public defender systems have been the target of most of the 
                                                
6 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
7 See id. 
8 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
9 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
10 Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 581 (2005). 
11 See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF 
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006) (reporting on serious problems with the state of New 
York’s indigent defense system and proposing several recommendations to address the problems 
identified by the Commission); Jessa DeSimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana 
Public Defender Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479 (2006) (reporting on the successful 
transformation of the Montana public defender system and citing cases that highlight problems 
with indigent defense systems of Louisiana, Arizona, and Oklahoma); Justine Finney Guyer, 
Saving Missouri’s Public Defender System: A Call for Adequate Legislative Funding, 74 MO. L. 
REV. 335 (2009) (discussing the shortcomings of Missouri’s public defense delivery system); Lisa 
R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent 
Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219 (2010) (examining funding level variations and the impact of the 
variations on public defender service delivery in five Arizona counties and concluding, in part, 
that “Arizona’s nonmetropolitan counties are at a greater risk of systematic deprivation of 
adequate council than their urban counterparts.”). 
12 See, e.g., Harvard Law Review Association, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to 
Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (2005); Robert L. 
Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1995); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFFALO L. REV. 329 (1995); American Bar 
Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken Promise: 
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criticism, and some authors cite similar problems in the federal system.13 
As described below, the focus of existing literature is almost exclusively 
on the crisis over ineffectiveness of counsel and solutions aimed at adding 
funding or increasing performance standards for attorneys.14  Relatively little 
attention is given to the study of the methods by which eligibility for court-
appointed counsel is determined.15  Understanding how determinations of 
eligibility are made is important because these decisions play the most significant 
role in ensuring the right to counsel for defendants who cannot afford to hire their 
own attorneys.  Thus, the implications for establishing a balanced and 
standardized approach to eligibility determination are significant.  In the absence 
of relatively objective and uniform standards, eligibility determinations are made 
more subjectively, increasing the risk of inequality in the appointment of 
counsel.16  A lack of uniformity in determining indigency could result in similarly 
situated defendants being treated unequally with respect to their Sixth 
Amendment rights.17  Further, without the ability to obtain counsel on their own, 
defendants may be forced to represent themselves,18 leading to a risk of worse 
case outcomes,19 including more convictions and longer sentences—concerns not 
shared by adequately represented defendants.20  On the other hand, if people 
                                                                                                                                
America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice (2004), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_scl
aid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf.  
13 See, e.g., John J. Cleary, Federal Defender Services: Serving the System or the Client? 58 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1995) (citing similar problems in the federal system that plague state 
systems).  But see Igna L. Parsons, "Making it a Federal Case": A Model for Indigent 
Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837 (1997) (arguing that the federal system exemplifies 
a model or best practice approach). 
14 See infra Part III.  
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g., Carrie Savage Phillips, Oklahoma’s Indigency Determination Scheme: A Call for 
Uniformity, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 655, 662-63 (2014) (arguing that while allowing judges “to exercise 
broad discretion in determining indigency status” permits the flexibility that is sometimes required 
for dealing with special cases, it also “encourage[s] . . . [or] perhaps even require[s] . . . judges to 
incorporate their own unique views in rendering a decision” which results in a lack of uniformity 
and compromises valued principles in our legal system of equal treatment and predictability).  
17 Id. at 655. 
18 Ben Kempinen, Dealing Fairly with An Unrepresented Person, 78 WIS. LAW. 12 (2005) (noting 
that “[i]n criminal matters, notwithstanding a right to counsel grounded in the U.S. and Wisconsin 
constitutions, many accused persons remain unrepresented because they cannot afford to retain 
private counsel and do not meet prevailing indigency standards”). 
19 George C. Thomas III, How Gideon v. Wainwright Became Goldilocks, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
307, 308 (2015) (arguing that “worse outcomes” at an “instrumental level” suggests fewer 
acquittals, fewer dismissals, and better plea deals with shorter sentences). 
20 Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L. J. 2676, 2678 (2013) (arguing that “[i]n 
a criminal justice system where almost all convictions are gained by guilty pleas–ninety-seven 
percent in federal court and ninety-four percent in state court–the presence of defense attorneys 
surely often makes an enormous difference in the nature of the plea deal and the length of the 
sentence”); see also Jona Goldschmidt & Don Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se 
Defense, 1996-2011: An Exploratory Study, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 81, 107 (2015) (concluding that, 
while pro se defendants in federal criminal cases were more likely to have their cases dismissed 
than those with appointed or retained counsel, pro se defendants were less likely to be acquitted 
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capable of paying for their own counsel are found eligible for court-appointed 
counsel, unnecessary stresses will be added to already overloaded public defender 
systems.  
The purpose of this Article is to determine how states make 
determinations of eligibility for court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants.  Specifically, through a comprehensive analysis of relevant state 
statutes, this Article seeks to identify the legislative parameters in state courts 
within which the decisions of eligibility for counsel are made for criminal 
defendants.  Results indicate that legislative direction for eligibility decisions 
varies widely, and many statutes lack objective eligibility criteria.  This Article 
concludes that the lack of adequate legislative guidance leaves broad discretion to 
state judges, which presents risks for decisions regarding indigency that threaten 
defendants’ equal protection guarantees and Sixth Amendment rights. 
II. EVOLUTION OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
 Deriving from English common law, the concept that criminal defendants 
have a right to attorney assistance against government prosecution was formally 
enshrined in the United States with the addition of the Bill of Rights to the 
Constitution in 1791.  The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states, in part, 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to…have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”21  The true connotation of that 
constitutional language did not take shape until the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the 
states.22  The Court’s involvement in fleshing out the contours of the right to 
counsel began with Powell v. Alabama in 193223 and Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938,24 
and would continue to expand through the procedural due process era of the 
Warren Court with Gideon v. Wainright25 and Argersinger v. Hamlin.26  
A.  Powell v. Alabama 
 
Powell v. Alabama marked the first time the Supreme Court dealt directly 
with the right to counsel, and it did so in the racially and politically charged 
South.27  On appeal for violations of the Sixth Amendment, the Court reversed the 
convictions of eight pro se black males convicted of raping two white girls.28  
Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland found “the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective 
                                                                                                                                
than defendants with retained counsel and were more likely to be found guilty by a jury or trial 
court than defendants with appointed or retained counsel). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
22 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).    
23 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
24 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
25 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
26 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
27 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 72. 
28 Id. 
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appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due process within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”29  While the Court limited the reach of the decision to 
defendants in state and federal capital cases, Powell represented a monumental 
step toward procedural fairness through the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.    
B. Johnson v. Zerbst 
 
The next significant step on the evolutionary map toward the maturation 
of the right to counsel was Johnson v. Zerbst.30  Defendant Johnson was tried and 
convicted of possessing and passing counterfeit money without the assistance of 
counsel.31  Upon review of Johnson’s habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the “Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with 
crime to the assistance of counsel, [and] compliance with this constitutional 
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to 
deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”32  With its decision in this case, the 
Court extended the right to counsel established in Powell to all criminal 
defendants facing federal prosecution. 
C. Betts v. Brady 
 
The Court next got the chance to review the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and the incorporation of those rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Betts v. Brady.33  Indicted for robbery, the state trial judge denied Betts’ request 
for court-appointed counsel for trial because the county only appointed counsel 
for defendants on trial for rape or murder.34  Betts pled not guilty, represented 
himself, and was convicted of robbery and sentenced to eight years in prison.35  
Upon review of Betts’ petition for habeas relief, the Supreme Court declined to 
extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel via the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause to non-capital state defendants.36  In a strongly worded dissent, 
Justice Black noted that “[d]enial to the poor of the request for counsel in 
proceedings based on charges of serious crime has long been regarded as 
shocking to the ‘universal sense of justice’ throughout this country.”37  Further, 
Justice Black suggested that a judicially approved practice should “assure that no 
man . . . be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty . . . [and] [a]ny 
other practice seems to . . . defeat the promise of our democratic society to 
provide equal justice under the law.”38 
                                                
29 Id. at 65. 
30 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
31 Id. at 459. 
32 Id. at 467. 
33 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
34 Id. at 456. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 473.  
37 Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 477 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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D. Gideon v. Wainwright 
 
Twelve years later in a case with very similar facts, Justice Black was 
vindicated through the Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.39  Defendant 
Gideon was arrested and charged in a Florida state court with breaking and 
entering into a pool hall with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.40  He appeared 
in court without an attorney and without funds to hire one, and he asked the judge 
to appoint one for him.41  The trial judge, abiding by the Court’s decision in Betts, 
denied the request, citing that courts can only appoint counsel for defendants 
charged with capital crimes.42  Gideon proceeded pro se, insisting that he was 
innocent, but the jury convicted and sentenced him to five years in prison.43  Upon 
review of Gideon’s writ of habeas corpus, a unanimous Supreme Court overruled 
Betts and reversed Gideon’s conviction.44  Justice Black authored the opinion, 
noting that the Court got it wrong in Betts, and in reversing that decision held that 
the right to counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial.45  
E. Argersinger v. Hamlin and Beyond 
 
With Gideon, the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
state non-capital defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment, and nine years 
later in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court confirmed that the right was not only 
reserved for felony defendants.46  In Argersinger, the Court held that the right to 
counsel was not governed by the classification of the offense, and that any 
defendant who faces deprivation of liberty as the result of any criminal 
prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, has the right to assistance of 
counsel.47  
Despite these landmark decisions, which doctrinally secured the right to 
counsel for defendants facing loss of liberty, the Court has never defined 
indigency or addressed the issue of how the right is to be practically 
implemented.48  Instead, the work of fleshing out the practicable details regarding 
how, when, and for whom the right should be afforded has been left to the federal 
and state legislatures and lower courts.  As a result, fifty-one disparate federal and 
state public defender systems have developed with little or no centralized 
                                                
39 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
40 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963).    
41 Id. at 337. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 344-45. 
46 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).  
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., Allison D. Kuhns, If You Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One Be Appointed for You?: 
How (Some) States Force Criminal Defendants to Choose between Posting Bond and Getting a 
Court-Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2012); Paul Marcus, Why the United 
States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not A Lot) of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 153-154 (2009); Phillips, supra note 14, at 657. 
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guidance.  Thus, the nature of indigent defense in this country varies widely.  For 
example, while more than half of the states have public defender systems that are 
organized as statewide systems,49 fourteen states delegate the responsibility for 
public defense to counties or groups of counties that comprise a judicial district.50  
The remaining states’ indigent defense delivery systems are operated under a type 
of hybrid of the state and county systems.51  The methods for providing court-
appointed attorneys also differ across various jurisdictions; some systems assign 
private defense attorneys from a rotation list or on an ad-hoc basis, while other 
systems enter into contracts with attorneys, bar associations, or non-profit 
organizations, which provide court-appointed counsel.52  Most jurisdictions, and 
virtually all of those with over 750,000 residents, operate public defender 
programs, which are operated as government or non-profit organizations with 
full-time staff attorneys and support personnel dedicated to defense services in the 
jurisdiction.53  States also use various means to fund their indigent defense 
delivery systems; some states provide all of the necessary funding for both county 
and state-based systems, while other county-based systems are funded solely 
through county funds derived from court costs or other user fees.54 Note too that 
many state systems utilize some combination of these funding methods.55   
With all of the various systems and methods that exist for the provision of 
indigent defense, it is perhaps no surprise to find that states have also adopted 
different methods for determining how eligibility for court-appointed counsel is 
determined.  This important aspect of indigent defense, however, has received 
very little attention in the extant literature.56   
III. THE FOCUS OF THE EXTANT LITERATURE 
 
The existing literature related to the delivery of indigent defense services 
is replete with examples illustrating that the nation’s public defender systems are 
in a “perpetual” state of crisis.57  The primary reason for the crisis cited by legal 
                                                
49 Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 37 (1995). 
50 Id. at 40. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 32. 
53 Id. at 36. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 41. 
56 But see Gershowitz, supra note 8 (addressing the issue of eligibility determination in the states 
and is mentioned further in the following section of this paper); John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a 
Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants 
of their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013); and Phillips, 
supra note 14. 
57 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance after 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L. J. 2150 (2013); DeSimone, supra note 9; Harvard Law 
Review Association, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent 
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); Richard Klein, Symposium Gideon–A Generation 
Later: The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433 (1999); 
NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT 
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009). 
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scholars and interest groups is the fact that many of these systems are severely 
under-funded. 58  The under-funding of public defender programs leads to a 
number of untenable consequences, each of which is given attention in the 
literature.  A lack of adequate funds results in lower salaries for public defenders, 
which makes recruiting and retaining qualified attorneys difficult because it 
discourages attorneys–many with enormous law school debts–from participating 
in the system at all.59  This can lead to a shortage of qualified attorneys to staff the 
public defender systems.60  The attorneys that remain to provide indigent defense 
services are faced with unmanageably large caseloads and often do not have the 
time or resources to provide competent assistance,61 and attempts to manage the 
caseload lead to very limited contact with defendants and rushed plea-deals.62  In 
fact, some argue that the refusal of states to address the under-funding of indigent 
defense systems has led to systemic neglect of indigent defendants and their 
rights.63  This results in some deserving defendants being denied meaningful 
counsel;64 some defendants refer to court-appointed attorneys as “public 
pretenders.”65  One legal scholar noted that the effects of thinly stretched 
defenders become particularly evident during the sentencing phase of trials, where 
defenders often “disappear,” making the prosecutor’s job of obtaining harsh 
punishments much easier.66  
The problem of underfunding for indigent defense is serious, and the 
effects go beyond a shortage of attorneys.  Additional effects include insufficient 
funds for trial resources such as expert, investigative, and support services, which 
leads to disparity in resources available to the prosecution compared to the 
defense.  This can be brought to bear on cases involving indigent defendants.67  
                                                
58 See, e.g., Rodger Citron, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve 
Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481 (1991); Harvard Law Review Association, supra 
note 10, at 1731-32; Vick, supra note 10; American Bar Association, Standing Comm. on Legal 
Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 10, at 7-13; Klein, supra note 55, at 1435.   
59 See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, 
supra note 10, at 9-10. 
60 See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, 
supra note 10, at 10; Stephen F. Hanlon, Boots on the Ground: State Constitutional Challenges to 
Indigent Defense Systems, 75 MO. L. REV. 751, 759 (2010) (citing a shortage of attorneys in 
Massachusetts willing to take appointments to defend indigent defendants due to very low hourly 
rates); Citron, supra note 56, at 484-85. 
61 See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, 
supra note 10, at 7, 17-18. Citron, supra note 56, at 484-85. 
62 See, e.g., American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, 
supra note 10, at 16. 
63 Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003). 
64 Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 10, at 1734. 
65 Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s 
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010) (citing testimony of Alan J. Crotzer, a 
wrongfully convicted Florida criminal defendant, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, in which Crotzer testified, “[w]e have a saying for 
public defenders in Florida: ‘public pretenders’”). 
66 Vick, supra note 10, at 426. 
67 American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 
10, at 21-22.  
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The lack of funding can also mean that attorneys involved in indigent defense 
operate in environments with “no provision for formal, systematic training” 
despite the complexity of the cases they handle.68  The effects of underfunding 
negatively impact the quality of services received by indigent clients.69  This 
problem is amplified by the lack of uniform performance standards for which 
public defenders can be held accountable.70  Ultimately, these factors combine to 
threaten the Sixth Amendment by compromising the effectiveness of counsel in 
violation of the Court’s holding in McMann v. Richardson, in which it was 
established that the right to counsel set forth in the Sixth Amendment must be 
construed as the right to effective assistance of counsel.71 
While most of the existing literature related to the nation’s indigent 
defense systems focuses broadly on the systemic problems referred to above, 
some are more narrowly concentrated, providing case studies which highlight 
specific systems that are failing to succeed,72 or have been recently overhauled.73  
In a recent comprehensive review of the past, present, and future of the Texas 
indigent defense system, the authors noted the need for the legislature to revise 
the criteria for determining indigent status to effectuate more efficient, accurate 
results.74  Specifically, the authors suggested the benefits of utilizing information 
from other government entities that provide assistance, such as housing 
assistance, food stamps, and county-subsidized healthcare, in order to make 
determinations for eligibility for court-appointed counsel.75  Additionally, in a 
recent review of Wisconsin’s indigent defense system, the author noted among 
many other problems that the criteria “established by the legislature to determine 
eligibility for a state public defender were flawed from the start . . . [and the] 
legislature's failure to update the eligibility criteria over the last 20 years has . . . 
[resulted in] thousands of Wisconsin's poor fac[ing] criminal charges without the 
assistance of counsel—thus, violating a fundamental right guaranteed by both our 
state and federal constitutions.”76   
Where the factors affecting the determination of indigency are addressed 
in the literature, there seems to be a consensus that these factors employed by 
                                                
68 Id. at 11. 
69 See, e.g., id. at 14-20; see also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 10, at 1734. 
70 American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 
10, at 10-11, 13-14. 
71 397 U.S. 759, 771. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 55, at 1435-36. 
72 See, e.g., David A. Felice, Justice Rationed: A Look at Alabama's Present Indigent Defense 
System with a Vision Towards Change, 52 ALA. L. REV. 975 (2001); Lola Velazquez-Aguilu, Not 
Poor Enough: Why Wisconsin’s System For Providing Indigent Defense is Failing, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 193 (2006); See also Parsons, supra note 11 (pointing out positive perspectives on the 
federal criminal justice system). 
73 DeSimone, supra note 9 (reviewing the overhaul of the Montana public defender system 
following a constitutional court challenge by the ACLU); see also Catherine Greene Burnett, 
Michael K. Moore, & Allan K. Butcher, In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective 
Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595 
(2001).  
74 Burnett, et al., supra note 71. 
75 Id. at 679. 
76 Velazquez-Aguilu, supra note 70, at 236. 
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some states can contribute to the problems that plague indigent defense systems.  
In addition to the state-specific studies cited above, the American Bar 
Association’s 2004 study of indigent defense systems cited unduly restrictive and 
outdated eligibility standards, resulting in many indigent defendants not receiving 
the assistance of counsel.77   
In an article that addressed the factors states consider to determine 
eligibility for counsel, Gross found that a majority of states use the Federal 
Poverty Guidelines, which are based on guidance from legislation, administrative 
rules, or agency practices.78  Gross argued, however, that to use “something as 
arbitrary as the Federal Poverty Guidelines” was “bad public policy.”79  He 
concluded that “guidelines based on the percentage of a household’s income spent 
on food” may be useful in assessing eligibility for some social programs, doing so 
for determining eligibility for assigned counsel “ignores economic realities.”80 
In a review of the Oklahoma indigency determination scheme, Phillips 
argued that the method employed by that state is flawed because it grants trial 
judges broad discretion that could result in similarly situated defendants being 
treated differently under the Sixth Amendment.81  Phillips argued that the 
Oklahoma system should be altered to decrease judicial discretion by transferring 
the authority for indigency decisions to the state’s public defender commission.82  
Phillips also recommended that the state implement a new method of determining 
eligibility for court-appointed counsel by creating a more objective predetermined 
points-based system, which considers the 10 factors that Oklahoma lawmakers 
consider relevant to a person’s financial condition—including income, assets, 
debts/liabilities, living expenses, and number of dependents among others.83  
Coupled with a provision that allows flexibility in unusual cases or cases with 
unforeseen circumstances, Phillips concluded that such a system would provide 
for greater uniformity in indigency determinations.84  
Recognizing the important role that the process for determining eligibility 
for court-appointed counsel has on an efficient, fair, and high-quality indigent 
defense delivery system, Fabelo suggested a review of that component of the 
system as a part of a comprehensive policy research strategy.85  Fabelo 
specifically noted that lacking from the current body of research with respect to 
the delivery of indigent defense services were considerations of who should be 
covered by the system, how requests for counsel should be screened, and whether 
eligibility should be limited to narrow populations of indigent defendants or 
broadened to allow for partial eligibility for defendants who can contribute to the 
                                                
77 American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 
10, at 12. 
78 Gross, supra note 54, at 1193-94. 
79 Id. at 1218. 
80 Id. at 1218. 
81 Phillips, supra note 14, at 686.  
82 Id. at 686. 
83 Id. at 659-60, 686. 
84 Id. at 686. 
85 Tony Fabelo, What Policy-makers Need to Know to Improve Indigent Defense Systems, 29 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 135, 146-49 (2004). 
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costs of their defense.86   
 Addressing a portion of this proposed research strategy, Gershowitz 
conducted a review of the eligibility criteria contained within state statutes and 
broadly categorized the criteria contained in the statutes by the degree of 
discretion afforded to the court in making eligibility determinations.87  He 
concluded that states have adopted a wide range of eligibility criteria, and most 
troubling was the lack of a “constitutional floor” or minimum threshold for 
presumptive determinations of eligibility for court-appointed counsel.  
Gershowitz argued that absent such a threshold, states would “define away the 
right to appointed counsel.”88 
 The current Article builds upon the works of Gross, Phillips, Fabelo, and 
Gershowitz by expanding the review of state statutes beyond simple eligibility 
criteria to several statutory components, reflecting the entire process by which 
determinations to appoint counsel are made.  Through a more comprehensive 
review of both the eligibility factors and the process by which eligibility is 
determined, a clearer picture emerges reflecting states’ approach to assigning 
court-appointed counsel.  From that picture, it is possible to more fully discern the 
nature of discretion afforded judges and other government officials and the 
concomitant risk posed for abuse and discriminatory practices and to defendants’ 
Constitutional rights.   
IV. THE REVIEW OF STATE STATUTES 
 
Broadly stated, the purpose of the right to counsel as well as the numerous 
other rights provided for in the Bill of Rights is a fair and just rule of government.  
More narrowly, the underlying goal of the right to counsel and the relevant 
Supreme Court decisions is to level the proverbial playing field in court 
proceedings between the government and the defendant, and among all classes of 
defendants notwithstanding wealth, gender, race or other personal characteristics.  
The goal of the eligibility determination process should be to ensure that every 
person that cannot afford an attorney is appropriately identified and 
accommodated.  At the same time, abuse of the system by those who can pay for 
all or a portion of their defense costs should be controlled to the extent possible to 
protect tight government budgets and restrict unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer 
funds.  With these principles in mind, the process used to determine which 
defendants should be granted government-subsidized counsel must be as objective 
as possible.  Some flexibility must be preserved in order to address issues that 
may arise in extraordinary cases; however, the establishment of a standard 
determination process with clear, objectively based criteria limits unchecked 
abuses of discretion and helps achieve procedural fairness.   
Statutory provisions are just one of several ways that states can set forth 
the parameters within which decisions for court-appointed counsel should be 
                                                
86 Id. at 147. 
87 Gershowitz, supra note 8, at 586. 
88 Id. 
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made.  Others include the establishment of agency administrative rules or 
regulations such as those promulgated by judicial councils and public defender 
agencies or commissions.  The judicial decisions of state trial and appellate courts 
serve to fill in the gaps left by both statutes and administrative guidelines.  State 
legislatures, however, should establish the framework that guides the eligibility 
determination process toward ensuring procedural fairness.   
The purpose of this Article is to determine how states make 
determinations of eligibility for court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants.  Through the identification and review of relevant state statutes, the 
research seeks to identify the legislative parameters within which the decisions of 
eligibility for counsel are made for criminal defendants in state courts.   
State statutes were analyzed to assess the extent to which state processes 
for determining eligibility for counsel legislatively address these concerns.  To 
begin, the codes of all fifty states were searched to identify statutes relevant to the 
issue at hand.89  After the statutes were compiled, they were reviewed for basic 
framework and components.  From this initial review, several statutory 
components related to eligibility determination processes were identified and 
chosen for use in evaluating the elements of all state statutes.  The chosen 
components address issues such as the timing of the determination; how the 
information on which the determination will be based is obtained; who makes the 
determination; sanctions for defendants who intentionally provide false 
information; and the nature of the eligibility criteria.  When statutes contain clear 
provisions addressing these issues, the determination process is made less 
subjective and discretionary.  Further, the effect of the provisions on objectivity is 
cumulative–the more of them that are present in the statute, the more objective the 
determination process becomes.  Each of the provisions used as criteria in the 
statute evaluation is described next. 
A. Provisions Describing the Process for Eligibility Determination 
 
Statutes describing the process by which eligibility determinations for 
court-appointed counsel can inject a degree of objectivity into the process.90  This 
can be accomplished through statutes that establish when the determinations must 
be made, set forth the means by which information for the determination will be 
obtained, designate decision-making authority, provide for sanctions for the 
submission of false information, and clearly indicate when the defendant must 
repay the costs of the defense.  
                                                
89 The searches were conducted using online resources - primarily Westlaw.  The initial searches 
were conducted using the search terms and phrases: indigent, needy, counsel, attorney, public 
defender, defender, and right to counsel.  The “hits” were reviewed and statutes relevant to the 
appointment of counsel in criminal proceedings were “bookmarked’ or saved for further review.  
In addition, state codes, also accessed via Westlaw, were also browsed and literature with cites to 
relevant indigency statutes were reviewed to ensure all relevant statutes were identified. 
90 See Phillips, supra note 14 (arguing generally for increased uniformity in the standards used to 
determine eligibility for court-appointed counsel, but, aside from addressing the assignment of 
decision-making authority (i.e., the court versus the public defender commission) does not speak 
to the other process elements of timing, information collection, or controls for false statements.) 
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i. Timing of the Eligibility Determination 
 
Under the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Rothgery v. Gillesp County, 
Texas, defendants’ right to counsel attaches at the time of the defendant’s first 
court appearance.91  Therefore, when defendants claim that they cannot afford to 
retain their own attorneys, the process to verify eligibility for court-appointed 
counsel should commence no later than the first appearance.  Some statutes 
stipulate that the determination should be made before or upon the first 
appearance,92 and others require a preliminary determination not later than 
arraignment.93  Still other state statutes do not specify the timing, but opt for more 
general standards, which indicate that the court must assign counsel to represent 
the defendant, “without unnecessary delay”94 or that the determination should be 
made in order for counsel to be available at “every critical stage of the 
proceedings against him.”95  Statutes that establish precisely when eligibility for 
court-appointed counsel will be determined leave less discretion to the court or 
other decision-makers regarding when to initiate the process.  
ii. Methods Used to Obtain Information 
 
The process is more objective when statutes set forth the methods that 
must be used to obtain information that will be used in determining eligibility.  
Many states’ statutes, for example, require defendants to complete some type of 
written statement, describing their financial information, including financial 
affidavits,96 certificates of indigency,97 financial statements,98 or applications99 for 
use in assessing eligibility.  Other statutes assess eligibility through a process 
whereby defendants will be interrogated100 or interviewed,101 sometimes under 
oath,102 about their financial condition.  
iii. Authority for Making the Determination 
 
Objectivity also increases when statutes specify who must make the 
                                                
91 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
92 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-852 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 31.120 (West 2015); 
VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 5236 (West 2015); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3901 (West 2015). 
93 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 15:147 (2015). 
94 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101(2) (West 2015). 
95 MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-32-9 3901(2) (West 2015); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 180.060 (West 
2015) (which similarly states “every stage of the proceedings”). 
96 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. § 604-A:2-c (West 
2015); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3903 (2015). 
97 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-213 (West 2015). 
98 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27707 (West 2015). 
99 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015). 
100 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (West 2015). 
101 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 211D, § 2A (2015). 
102 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18-85-120 (West 2015). 
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determination of eligibility.  Many states may authorize judges103 or other court 
officials104 to do so, while some delegate this responsibility to public defender 
offices105 or even probation officers.106  Still others may choose to use an 
approach employing a combination of officials to make and review eligibility 
decisions.107  The assignment of responsibility for making the determination is 
important as it sets forth who, ultimately, is accountable for the decision. 
iv. Sanctions for False Information 
 
To protect public defender systems from abuse by those that do not need 
court-appointed counsel, many state indigency determination statutes contain 
language that specifies sanctions for defendants who intentionally provide false 
information during eligibility determination.  Most such statutes stipulate that 
such an act constitutes perjury subject to criminal sanctions,108 but civil sanctions 
are also a possibility in some states.109 
v. Recoupment of Costs for Defense 
 
Presumably to try to offset some of the costs of defense by court-
appointed counsel, some state statutes include language that requires defendants 
who are able to repay some or all of the costs of their defense.  Some statutes 
specify that defendants must be made aware in advance of appointing counsel that 
defendants will have to repay costs of defense if they are convicted of the 
offense,110 while others stipulate that repayment is only required if a defendant 
was “erroneously or improperly determined to be indigent.” 111  Whether such 
recoupment provisions are prudent policy or even constitutional in some cases is 
debatable.112  Requiring defendants to reimburse the state for all or some the costs 
of their defense–should they later become able to do so–seems reasonable at first 
glance.  However, to the extent repayment requirements affect defendants’ 
                                                
103 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-8-52; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3 (West 2015); See 
also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-453 (West 2015). 
104 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5236 (West 2015) (where the court clerk makes the determination). 
105 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-297 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-24 (West 2015); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-4; (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.06 (West 2015). 
106 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211D § 2A (West 2015). 
107 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.05 (West 2015); 
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-16 (West 2015). 
108 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18-85-120 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 31.120 (West 
2015). 
109 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3 (West 2015). 
110 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.120 (West 2015) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (West 
2015). 
111 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202 (West 2015). 
112 See Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their 
Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 MICH. J. L. & REFORM 
323 (2009).  The author examines the pros and cons of recoupment provisions, cites to other 
articles that address the subject, and ultimately concludes that recoupment provisions are not only 
bad policy, but they also threaten defendants’ Sixth Amendment and equal protection rights.  
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decisions to opt for court-appointed counsel due to fears of long-term debt or 
property liens, a different picture emerges revealing risks to Sixth Amendment 
and equal protection rights.113  The policy implications of recoupment provisions 
are not the focus of this Article, but the analysis does consider which states’ 
statutes include them and a description of the nature of the provisions identified.  
 
B. Statutory Criteria for Determining Eligibility 
 
The key components of statutes regarding defendants’ eligibility for court-
appointed counsel are those specifying the criteria for eligibility.  Where the 
criteria lack specificity and decision-makers are afforded discretion in the 
determination, mistakes can be costly to defendants’ rights or to the state’s 
coffers.  Eligibility criteria in state statutes range from a mention of a general 
financial standard to descriptions of elaborate formulas and presumptive 
eligibility (or non-eligibility) thresholds.  State statutes may contain provisions 
allowing partial eligibility for defendants who can afford to pay some, but not all, 
of their defense costs.  Several states’ statutes are completely devoid of any 
mention of eligibility criteria; instead, these states delegate rule-making authority 
to certain agencies and task them with establishing the criteria.114  
i. General Standard for Eligibility 
 
Most state statutes contain some language regarding the standard used to 
determine eligibility for court-appointed counsel.  In fact, in some cases, a general 
standard is the only guidance legislatures provide.115  Such general eligibility 
standards may denote that defendants should be appointed an attorney if they are: 
“without sufficient funds or assets to employ an attorney or afford other necessary 
expenses incidental thereto;”116 “financially able to employ counsel;”117  “unable 
to provide for the full payment of an attorney;”118 or unable “to retain legal 
counsel without prejudicing one's financial ability to provide economic necessities 
for one's self or one's family.”119 
ii. Specific Factors for Consideration 
 
Many states offer more guidance by providing specific factors that courts 
should use to make eligibility determinations.  The Alaska legislature requires 
                                                
113 Id. at 357–67. 
114 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4602 
(West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-07-01.1, 54-61-02 (West 2015). 
115 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-201 (West 2015); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 2015); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-4 (West 2015). 
116 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-201 (West 2015). 
117 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80–4 (West 
2015). 
118 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-102 (West 2015). 
119 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901 (West 2015). 
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consideration of defendants’ “income, property owned, outstanding obligations, 
and the number and ages of dependents.”120  Similarly, Oregon statutes suggest 
consideration of a defendant’s “assets, liabilities, current income, dependents[,] 
and other information….”121  While such statutes provide increased objectivity 
compared to those only containing general eligibility standards, they still lack 
clear benchmarks or thresholds against which defendants’ resources can be 
compared to make determinations.  
iii. Presumptive Thresholds 
 
Thus, statutes that contain the most objective eligibility criteria are those 
that prescribe presumptive thresholds.  In these states, defendants may be 
presumed to be eligible for court-appointed counsel if they meet particular 
requirements.  Some statutes leave little room for court discretion when they 
specify that defendants who earn income below a particular percentage of federal 
poverty guidelines are presumed to be eligible.122  Even less subjective are 
statutes that establish both lower and upper presumptive thresholds.123  Some 
states apply presumptive thresholds based upon whether defendants already 
receive government assistance such as food stamps, public housing, or state-
subsidized medical insurance.124  
The following section contains the results of the analysis of state statutes 
related to the determination of eligibility for court-appointed counsel based on the 
foregoing statutory criteria. 
V.  RESULTS: THE NATURE OF STATUTORY GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBILITY 
DETERMINATIONS 
 
 Results revealed that state laws addressing the appointment of counsel 
varied considerably with respect to organization and the comprehensiveness of 
content guiding the eligibility determination processes.  The research led to the 
identification of relevant statutes in all states though the statutes varied greatly.  
Almost all states had statutes that addressed some part of the eligibility 
determination process and contained language establishing a general standard for 
eligibility for court-appointed counsel.  In general, statutes were more 
                                                
120
 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.120 (West 2015). 
121 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.485 (West 2015). 
122 Louisiana statutes, for example, note that defendants earning less than 200% of the federal 
poverty level are presumed to be eligible, while Montana statutes set the presumptive threshold at 
less than 133% of the federal poverty level. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:175 (West 2015). 
123 For example, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia have lower presumptive 
thresholds, indicating that defendants who earn less than a particular percentage on the poverty 
guidelines are eligible for court-appointed counsel, and upper thresholds, which exclude from 
eligibility those earning above particular percentages unless extreme hardship is established.  See 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-24 (West 2015); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 815.9 (West 2015); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-03 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.13, § 
5236 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (West 2015). 
124 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 15:175 (2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2015). 
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comprehensive in the coverage of the various components describing the process 
of eligibility determination than in the stipulation of particular eligibility criteria 
for use in making the decisions.  Table 1 summarizes the results of the review by 
indicating the elements present in the statutes (marked by an X or other indicator) 
grouped according to whether the factors were related to the process or eligibility 
criteria.  
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Table 1. Elements Present in State Eligibility Statutes  
  Determination Process Criteria for eligibility 
State Timing Specif. 
Describes 
Process 
to Collect 
Info 
Who 
Decides?1 
Penalty  
For False   
Info 
Def. 
Must 
Repay 
General 
Standard 
Specific 
Factors 
Presumptive 
Threshold2 
Partial 
eligibility Delegated 
Alabama   X C X X X X  L   X 
Alaska   X C X X X X    X   
Arizona    C  X          
Arkansas   X C X X X      X X 
California   X C X X X         
Colorado   X PD/C X X         X 
Connecticut   X PD X X X X      X  
Delaware X   PD/C              
Florida   X CC X X X X L/U     
Georgia     PD   X   X L/U    X  
Hawaii   X PD    X    X   
Idaho X X C X X   X  L     
Illinois X X C X X    X        
Indiana X   C   X    X    X X 
Iowa X X C X X   X L/U     
Kansas   X C   X X X   X X 
Kentucky X X C X    X    X    
Louisiana X X C    X X L    
Maine                   X  
Maryland   X     X X X L X   
Massachusetts   X PO X X X  X  L X X 
Michigan X  X C    X X  L  X   
Minnesota   X C   X X X L     
Mississippi   X C    X X       
Missouri   X PD/C X X X X   X  X  
Montana   X C X  X X L     
Nebraska X X C X X X  X       
Nevada   X C    X         
New Hampshire   X C   X X  X    X X 
New Jersey   X C   X X X   X   
New Mexico X X C X X X  X      
New York         X       X 
North Carolina X X C X X X     X X 
North Dakota     C   X         X 
Ohio   X PD/C   X X X L/U X   
Oklahoma   X C X X   X  U3  X 
Oregon   X C   X X X   X X 
Pennsylvania   X PD X X X         
Rhode Island   X PD X  X  X        
South Carolina   X C   X X  X    X  X  
South Dakota    C  X X     X   
Tennessee   X C X  X X   X   
Texas   X C    X X     X 
Utah   X C X X X X L     
Vermont X X CC X X X X L/U  X   
Virginia   X C  X   X X L/U     
Washington X X C X  X X L X   
West Virginia   X PD/C X X X X  X X 
Wisconsin   X PD  X  X X X U X X 
Wyoming X X C X X X     X X 
1 Denotes who, specifically is authorized to make the determination: C = Court; PD = Public Defender; CC = 
Court Clerk; PO = Probation Officer 
2 Denotes the nature of the presumptive threshold: L = Lower; U = Upper; U/L = Both Upper and Lower 
3Oklahoma’s statute stipulates that if the defendant is able to post bond, the fact constitutes a “rebuttable 
presumption that the defendant is not indigent.”  
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A. Statutory Treatment of the Eligibility Determination Process 
 
All states except two (Maine and New York) have statutes that included at 
least one element describing the process for the determination of eligibility for 
court-appointed counsel.  The most commonly present process-related elements 
were those indicating who was authorized to make the decision, which was 
present in forty-seven states (all except Maine, Maryland, and New York), and 
those describing at least some part of the process by which information regarding 
eligibility should be gathered, which was present in forty-two states (all except 
Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, New York, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota).  Language that establishes criminal or civil sanctions for 
defendants who provide false statements about their financial condition were 
found in the statutes of twenty-eight states.  Elements setting forth the precise 
timing requirements for determining eligibility for counsel were less common; 
only fifteen states had such provisions.   
The statutes of ten states contained all four of the elements describing the 
process for determining the eligibility of counsel (Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming).  
Based on the criteria selected for evaluation, these states appear to have the least 
subjective and most transparent, legislatively defined processes for assessing 
eligibility.  Such statutory guidance is helpful in ensuring that those who should 
receive court-appointments do so; however, the characteristics of the assessment 
process alone do not create the full picture.  The eligibility criteria applied during 
the process are even more critical to limiting unnecessarily broad discretion 
toward the ultimate goal of procedural fairness.    
As Table 1 shows, thirty-five states have statutes that allow the state to 
seek some manner of reimbursement for some or all of the costs of defending 
those defendants that it deems indigent.  Seven states, however, provide for 
recoupment only if the defendant is convicted or pleads guilty to the offense 
charged;125 and another six allow recoupment only if the original indigency 
decision was made incorrectly due to errors or false statements.126  Of the thirty-
five states with recoupment statutes, about half give the court flexibility in 
deciding to pursue reimbursement from the defendant,127 and twenty-three states 
have statutes that require the state to find a subsequent ability of the defendant to 
                                                
125 Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, and North Carolina have statutes that 
provide for recoupment from defendants only if they are convicted or plead guilty or no contest. 
126 Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah statutes only provide for 
recoupment in the event that the court finds that the defendant was not originally entitled to or 
eligible for court-appointed counsel or if the court finds that the defendant made false statements 
regarding his financial condition. 
127 Seventeen state statutes indicate the court “may” seek reimbursement (Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), while 18 statutes stipulate that the 
court “shall” do so (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont).   
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pay as a condition of reimbursement.128  However, six states require the court to 
seek recoupment notwithstanding the defendant’s ability to pay.129  The method of 
repayment varies, but in at least nine states includes civil judgments and/or liens 
against the defendants’ property.130  The Arkansas statute specifies that state 
income tax refunds or lottery winnings “shall be intercepted” to pay for defense 
costs.131  
B. Presence of Eligibility Criteria in State Statutes 
 
Thirty-eight states had statutes that contained language articulating at least 
a general standard of eligibility for counsel.  As noted above, general standards 
are very broad statements describing eligible requirements.  Examples of such 
statements include those indicating that defendants are “financially unable to 
employ council,”132 “does not have the means at his disposal or available to him 
to obtain counsel in his behalf,”133 and an “inability to retain legal counsel without 
prejudicing one's financial ability to provide economic necessities for one's self or 
one's family”134 are eligible for court-appointed attorneys.   The statutes of twelve 
states had no such general standard.135  Of those, five states’ (Arizona, Colorado, 
Delaware, Maine, and North Dakota) statutes had none of the factors regarding 
eligibility for counsel, and in all but one of these states, the legislatures delegated 
the authority for establishing eligibility criteria to other agencies or commissions 
(Arizona, Colorado, Maine, and North Dakota).  Thus, Delaware was the only 
state with statutes that were completely silent on anything related to criteria for 
eligibility. 
 Thirty-six states had statutes that set forth specific factors that should be 
considered when determining eligibility for court-appointed counsel, though some 
of the factors were admittedly limited in the guidance set forth.  For example, 
South Carolina’s statute stipulates that the eligibility determination should simply 
consider “all [of the person’s] assets,”136 and the Oklahoma statute states that the 
consideration should include whether or not the defendant has been “released on 
                                                
128 Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia statutes all contain 
language suggesting that recoupment decisions would consider the defendant’s ability to pay–not 
only at the time of the initial proceedings, but for some time after in most cases.    
129 Statutes for Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina 
have language indicating that the court “shall” seek reimbursement or repayment from the 
defendant, but do not have any stipulations regarding the defendant’s ability to pay for those costs. 
130 California, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
and South Dakota statutes authorize the state to enter a judgment against the defendant and/or a 
lien against his or her property. 
131 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-213 (West 2015). 
132 See, e.g., N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 717 (McKinney 2015). 
133 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086 (West 2015). 
134 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901 (West 2015). 
135 Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, North Dakota, 
and Oklahoma included no language defining indigency or setting a general standard for eligibility 
of counsel.  
136 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-30 (2015). 
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bond.”137 Most state statutes that specify factors for consideration in indigency 
determination decisions include several aspects related directly to a defendant’s 
financial condition including: “the nature, extent, and liquidity of assets, the 
disposable net income of the defendant, the nature of the offense, the effort and 
skill required to gather pertinent information and the length and complexity of the 
proceedings;”138 “income, property owned, outstanding obligations and the 
number and ages of his dependents;”139 “current income prospects, taking into 
account seasonal variations in income,” liquid assets, “fixed debts and 
obligations,” child care, transportation, age, physical infirmity, efforts made to 
obtain private legal representation;140 and comparison of the “defendant’s assets 
and incomes with the minimum cost of obtaining qualified private counsel.”141   
Thirteen states allowed for the consideration of the cost of and the defendant’s 
ability to make bail or bond when determining eligibility for court-appointed 
counsel,142 and in five of those cases, the statutes specifically say that counsel 
should not be denied based on the defendant’s ability to do so.143  Seven states’ 
statutes stipulate that the income or assets of the defendant’s spouse or immediate 
family–and in one case the defendant’s friends and employer–should be 
considered when assessing eligibility for court-appointed counsel.144  Another 
area of consideration in state eligibility criteria was related to the nature and 
complexity of the case against the defendant, and recognizing that more complex 
cases will cost more to defend, the statutes of six states contained such a 
provision.145  Additionally, New Jersey statutes required that defendants 
“demonstrate convincingly that he has consulted at least three private attorneys, 
                                                
137 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A (West 2015).  (The defendant’s ability to post bond is the 
only factor for consideration specified in the Oklahoma statutes.  As noted below, several other 
state statutes mention consideration of the defendant’s ability to post bond and whether that factor 
should be considered when determining eligibility.); See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086 (West 
2015) (requiring consideration of a defendant’s “ability to make bond, his income and the number 
of persons dependent on him for support….”); See also, Kuhns, supra note 46, at 1810 (examining 
the effects of using the ability to post bond on indigency determination and arguing that statutes 
that presume a defendant is not indigent if he or she can post bond “forces individuals to make an 
impossible choice between the right to counsel and liberty”). 
138 ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (2015). 
139 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-5 (West 2015). 
140 W.VA. CODE § 29-21-16 (West 2015). 
141 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:2-(c) (2015). 
142 The states with statutes citing the cost and/or ability of the defendant to make bail/post bond 
are Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, 
Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. 
143 New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, and Washington prevent out right denial of counsel 
simply because of the defendant’s ability to make bail or post bond. 
144 The statutes of Indiana and Mississippi include spousal income as factors for consideration as 
do the statutes in Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin except those that specify that the spouse’s 
income should only be considered if the spouse is not the victim of the alleged crime of the 
defendant.  Montana’s statute includes consideration of others in the “household,” and New 
Jersey’s includes reference to consideration of the willingness and ability of immediate family, 
friends, and the defendant’s employer to assist with the costs of the defense. 
145 The states with statutes that included consideration of the complexity of the case at hand in 
eligibility determination proceedings include: Alabama, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Utah, and 
Washington. 
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none of whom would accept the case for a fee within his ability to pay.”146  
Finally, three states, Kansas, Minnesota, and Utah have statutory provisions 
requiring the court to consider whether defendants may have transferred or 
otherwise divested themselves of assets in anticipation of eligibility 
determination.147 
Eighteen states have statutes with criteria that specify presumptive 
thresholds for eligibility.  As noted above, presumptive thresholds are benchmarks 
against which a defendant’s financial condition is compared to determine 
eligibility.  Benchmarks can be either categorical or quantitative in nature and can 
be based on a minimum income (lower threshold) or a maximum income (upper 
threshold) or both.  Maryland’s statute, for example, sets a lower quantitative 
presumptive threshold by stipulating that defendants’ whose “assets and net 
annual income are less than 100 percent of the federal poverty guidelines” are 
deemed eligible for public defender services with no additional needs 
assessment.148  Both Louisiana and Washington statutes include both quantitative 
and categorical lower presumptive eligibility thresholds.  For example, Louisiana 
statutes stipulate that a defendant who either earns less than twenty percent of 
federal poverty guidelines or receives government assistance, such as food 
stamps, Medicaid, or public housing is presumed to be eligible for court-
appointed counsel.149  Similarly, Washington statutes presume defendants that 
earn less than 125 percent of federal poverty guidelines or receive government 
assistance benefits are indigent.150  Of the eighteen states with statutes that 
include eligibility thresholds, ten provide for one or both of these types of lower 
presumptive thresholds,151 and these states are denoted in Table 1 with an “L” in 
the “Presumptive Threshold” column. 
The Florida statute provides an example of an upper presumptive 
threshold because it stipulates that a defendant having a net equity of $2,500 or 
more in property, excluding the value of his or her home and vehicle worth under 
$5,000, is presumed ineligible for court-appointed counsel.152  Also, in Georgia, 
defendants earning more than 250 percent of the federal poverty guidelines are 
presumed ineligible for court-appointed counsel, unless they can prove 
extraordinary conditions or hardship.153  States with statutes that specify upper 
                                                
146 N.J. PERM. STAT. § 2A:158A-14 (West 2015).  See also W.VA. CODE § 29-21-16 (stipulating 
that West Virginia eligibility decisions should consider whether the defendant “has made 
reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain private legal representation[] and the result of those 
efforts”). 
147 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4513; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
32-202. 
148 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-210 (West 2015).  For defendant’s whose “assets and net 
annual income equal or exceed 100 percent of the federal poverty guideline,” a more detailed 
needs assessment will be conducted to determine eligibility.   
149 LA. STAT. ANN § 15:147 (2015). 
150 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.010 (West 2015). 
151 Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, 
Utah, and Washington all have statutory language establishing a lower presumptive threshold for 
eligibility. 
152 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015). 
153 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-2 (West 2015). 
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presumptive thresholds are shown in Table 1 denoted with a “U.”  Most states 
with statutes that have upper presumptive thresholds also have lower thresholds.  
Both Florida and Georgia, in addition to the upper thresholds described here also 
have lower thresholds based on income-levels compared to the federal poverty 
guidelines.154  Six states have both upper and lower thresholds, and these are 
shown in Table 1 with an “U/L.”155  However, the statutes of two states only 
provide for upper thresholds–or statutes that presumptively assume non-eligibility 
or non-indigence.  The Wisconsin statute presumes that defendants’ assets or 
income are “available to the person to pay the costs of legal representation if the 
assets exceed $2,500 in combined equity value” or if his or her “gross income 
exceeds 115 percent of the federal poverty guidelines.”156  Oklahoma’s statutes 
set a very strict upper threshold by stipulating that if the defendant is able to make 
bail or post bond–with his own money or with the help of another person–this 
“shall constitute a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is not indigent.”157 
Statutes reflecting both lower and upper presumptive thresholds, with an 
exception clause, such as in the Georgia statute described above, provide the most 
objectivity in the eligibility determination, while maintaining needed flexibility to 
consider dire situations that may compromise an otherwise financially capable 
defendant’s ability to pay for all of his defense costs.  
Twenty-three states have statutes with partial-eligibility provisions that 
allow for the fact that some defendants may be able to afford to pay for some, but 
not all, of their defense costs.158  Where partial eligibility provisions exist, courts 
may appoint counsel but order the defendant to make co-payments to the public 
defender or court.159  Partial eligibility provisions present flexibility needed by 
many defendants who are not totally destitute, but simply cannot afford costly up-
front retainer fees and hourly-billing rates of privately retained attorneys.    
 Finally, twenty-one states have statutes that specifically delegate all or a 
portion of the authority for setting eligibility standards and determining the 
process by which such determinations should be made.160  In Colorado, for 
example, the responsibility for setting eligibility criteria lies with the state 
                                                
154 Florida presumes that defendants that earn less than 200 percent of federal poverty guidelines 
to be indigent and eligible for court-appointed counsel. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015).  
Georgia presumes that defendants that earn less than 100 percent of federal poverty guidelines to 
be indigent and eligible for court-appointed counsel. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-2 (West 2015). 
155 Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia statutes include language establishing 
both upper and lower presumptive eligibility and non-eligibility thresholds. 
156 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.02 (West 2015). 
157 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A (West 2015). 
158 Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have 
provisions requiring defendants who cannot afford to pay all but can afford to pay a portion of 
their defense costs to do so. 
159 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 110, at 329-32. 
160 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming statutes delegate the responsibility for 
establishing eligibility criteria or standards to a particular state agency. 
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supreme court.161  Indiana statutes delegate the same authority to the state’s 
Public Defender Commission,162 while in Massachusetts, the Committee for 
Public Counsel is responsible,163 and in Kansas it is the job of the State Board of 
Indigent Defense Services to set eligibility standards.164  In North Dakota, every 
aspect related to indigent defense, including establishing criteria, creating 
processes, and making the ultimate determination is the purview of the North 
Dakota Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents.165 
C. Overall Comprehensiveness of States’ Statutes 
 
The characteristics of both the process used and the eligibility criteria 
applied to ascertain eligibility for counsel are critical to any overall judgment 
regarding state statute comprehensiveness and objectivity.  To the extent that the 
criteria chosen to evaluate the state statutes in this case (notwithstanding the 
elements accounting for recoupment of defense costs and the delegation of the 
determination duties) can be said to be indicative of clarity and objectivity in the 
determination process, one could argue that the effects are cumulative.  When 
more of these specific elements are contained in state statutes, the less subjective 
the determination process becomes.  With that in mind, the data collected for this 
Article and reflected in Table 1 was used to generate the sum of the number of 
statutory elements present in each state’s statutes.  For example, the first state 
listed in Table 1 is Alabama, and the table shows that Alabama statutes include 
six of the eight key elements (again, not including the “Repay” or “Delegated” 
elements).  The six elements contained in the Alabama statutes include: 
description of process to collect eligibility information (“Describes Process to 
Collect Info”), assignment of who is responsible for the eligibility determination 
(“Who Decides?), stipulation of penalties for defendants that provide false 
information (“Penalty for False Info”), language stating a general eligibility 
standard (“General Standard”), specific factors that should be considered when 
assessing eligibility (“Specific Factors”), and a lower presumptive threshold for 
eligibility (“Presumptive Threshold” = “L”).  Thus, by summing the number of 
elements, Alabama would receive a “score” of six.  Maine statutes do not include 
any of the eight key elements and would receive scores of zero, while Arizona, 
New York, and North Dakota would each receive a score of one because statues 
of those states only have one element each.  This scoring was done for all states in 
order to determine which states had relatively more comprehensive and objective 
legislative direction for determining which defendants are eligible for counsel.  
Using this methodology, Vermont and Washington scored the highest, because 
the statutes of those states contained all eight criteria reviewed.  The frequency 
data were graphed, and the results (shown in Figure 1 with state abbreviations 
placed within the frequency bars) indicated a slightly skewed distribution of the 
                                                
161   COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-103 (West 2015). 
162   IND. CODE ANN. § 33-40-5-4 (West 2015). 
163   MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 211D § 2 (West 2015). 
164   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (West 2015). 
165   N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-61-02 (West 2015). 
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number of statutory elements across the fifty states, with most states having 
between four and six.            
 
       
Figure 1. Number of Statutory Elements (Eligibility and Process) Present per State 
 
 Based on this analysis it can be concluded that Vermont and Washington 
(with eight elements) and Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin (with seven 
elements) have statutes that, based on the criteria chosen, provide the most 
objective means for determining eligibility for assigned counsel.  Obviously, this 
simple analysis does not take into account the notion that all of the elements 
chosen for this review may not represent equally important aspects of state 
statutes.  For example, noted above was the argument that statutes that stipulate 
both upper and lower thresholds provide a more objective basis for determining 
eligibility for court-appointed counsel.  Such considerations are not taken into 
account here, because the method was used to simply get a measure of how states 
stack up against one another.  Additionally, it could be argued that the most 
important elements of the analysis should be limited to the ones that focus on the 
criteria for determining which defendants are eligible for court-appointed counsel, 
and not the process by which the determination is made.  Results for limiting the 
analysis to the four eligibility components–general eligibility standards, specific 
factors to be considered, presumptive eligibility thresholds, and partial eligibility 
provisions are in Figure 2.  Only seven states have statutes with all four eligibility 
 
	WI	
 
		WA	
 
		ND	
 
	SD	
 
192                 Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice         [Vol. 5.2 
    
components, while 10 states have fewer than two of the components.  Most states, 
however, have at least two or three of the eligibility components, and therefore, 
provide some legislative guidance for the eligibility determination decisions. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Eligibility Elements Present per State 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Results of this Article indicate that states statutes vary considerably with 
respect to the extent to which they prescribe processes and eligibility criteria for 
determining the need for court-appointed counsel.  Some states’ statutes provide 
virtually no direction on the issue, while others contain several sound and 
objective criteria for use in making eligibility decisions.  While this Article 
provides a starting point for understanding how decisions to appoint counsel are 
made in the states, at this point it would be problematic to draw firm conclusions.  
As noted above, state statutes represent just one source of information related to 
how states determine indigency.  To gain a more complete and accurate picture, 
analysis of the administrative guidelines of agencies and commissions as well as 
the case law of each state is necessary.  Nevertheless, state legislation serves the 
important function of creating the basic parameters within which lower courts and 
agency decisions are typically made.  Therefore, legislatures that firmly establish 
sound, objective criteria upon which determinations of eligibility can be made, 
help ensure that defendants’ rights will be protected and counsel will be appointed 
when needed.   
Notwithstanding the fact that several state legislatures have set forth 
clearly objective standards for the determination of eligibility, this Article makes 
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apparent that many states lack such legislative guidance.  These states leave broad 
discretion to magistrates and trial court judges to make these decisions.  Mistakes 
in making that decision which result in denial of court-appointed counsel for a 
defendant who cannot afford to hire his or her own have potentially serious 
implications.  While courts’ discretionary decisions can normally be reviewed for 
clear error and abuse of discretion, those standards are often difficult to prove.  
This would particularly be the case for defendants who do not have the assistance 
of an attorney to file an appeal.  A lack of objective criteria to guide eligibility 
decision-making can lead to unequal treatment under the law, and unfettered 
judicial discretion increases the risk that those decisions will be made based on 
personal prejudices or biases.  Discriminatory decisions clearly could lead to 
violations of defendants’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Here, 
legislatures and judiciaries should learn from problems with judicial discretion in 
the area of criminal sentencing.166  Sentencing disparities that raised concerns 
about discrimination and inequality have led to substantive changes in the way 
sentences are determined, by significantly reducing judicial discretion through 
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing structures.167  Clearly, 
the criminal justice system has seen the effects of a lack of objective standards on 
particular classes of defendants, thus legislatures should take note and apply those 
lessons learned in other areas, including the appointment of counsel.    
The right to counsel is a fundamental right, but when those who require 
court-appointed counsel exercise that right, the government must take on the role 
of adequately managing and funding public defender systems.  Today, as noted 
above, most accounts indicate that the nation’s state public defender systems are 
in a state of crisis due to huge caseloads and a lack of funding.  Denying counsel 
to those that need it and are facing a loss of liberty should not be the means to 
decrease public defender caseloads.  Perhaps a different approach is warranted, 
specifically, examining a different way to control inputs into the system.   
This nation’s paramount criminal justice paradigm of the last thirty years 
has no doubt contributed to the problem by increasing the demand on the criminal 
justice system.  The “get-tough on crime” philosophy accompanied by the “Wars 
on Crime, Drugs, and Terror” has led to increased criminalization of offenses 
once considered minor.168  One of the results of this phenomenon has been an 
increase in the number of offenses for which loss of liberty is a potential sanction.  
In addition, harsher punishment strategies have also increased the demands on the 
criminal justice system by incarcerating more defendants for longer periods of 
time.  This is particularly evident when the impact of three-strikes laws and 
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes are considered.169  One important 
consequence of the expansion of criminal laws and sanctions for breaking those 
laws is the increased demand on public defender systems.170  
                                                
166 Phillips, supra note 14, at 670-72. 
167 Id. 
168 NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, supra note 55, at 70. 
169 Sara Steen & Rachel Bandy, When the Policy Became the Problem: Criminal Justice in the 
New Millennium, 9 PUNISH. & SOC’Y 5 (2007).  
170 Greg Hollon, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover, 31 HARV. C. R. - C.L. 
L. REV. 499 (1996). 
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The workload on the public defender system and the concomitant drain on 
state budgets are just two of the many negative effects of the criminalization trend 
of the last three decades.  The other numerous deleterious effects need not be 
itemized here; however, their combined impact on the justice system, government 
as a whole, and society indicates a change may be necessary.  Perhaps such a 
change–one in which the justice system is more focused on identifying and 
addressing front-end factors related to the sources and root causes of crime and 
less on increased criminalization and retribution–could lead to benefits across 
many facets of society, not just in decreasing the public defender caseload.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2. State Statutes Analyzed 
 
STATE STATUTES  
ALABAMA ALA. CODE § 15-12-1, 5, 25 (2015) 
ALASKA ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.110, 120, 170 (West 2015) 
ARIZONA ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499.09, § 11-584 (2015) 
ARKANSAS ARK. CODE ANN.§ 16-87-201, 213 (West 2015) 
CALIFORNIA CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706, § 27707 (West 2015) CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West 2015) 
COLORADO COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 21-1-103, 106 (West 2015) 
CONNECTICUT CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-289, 297-298 (West 2015) 
DELAWARE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 4602 (West 2015) 
FLORIDA FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (West 2015) 
GEORGIA GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-2, 24, 51, 80 (West 2015) 
HAWAII HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-2, 3, 4, 6 (West 2015) 
IDAHO IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-852, 854 (West 2015) 
ILLINOIS 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3, 5/133.3.1 (West 2015) 
INDIANA IND. CODE ANN. § 33-40-5-4, 6, 7, § 35-33-7-6 (West 2015) 
IOWA IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.9 (West 2015)  
KANSAS KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4503, 4504 (West 2015) 
KENTUCKY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.110,120 (West 2015) 
LOUISIANA LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:143, 175 (2015) 
MAINE ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 1804 (2015) 
MARYLAND WEST'S MD. CODE ANN. § 16-210, 211 (West 2015) 
MASSACHUSETTS MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 211D § 2, 2A, ch. 261 § 27A, 27B (2015) 
MICHIGAN MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.991 (West 2015) 
MINNESOTA MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17, 18, 20 (West 2015) 
MISSISSIPPI MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-32-9, § 99-15-15 (West 2015) 
MISSOURI MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086, 090 (West 2015) 
MONTANA MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101, § 47-1-111 (West 2015) 
NEBRASKA NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901-3903, 3908, 3916 (West 2015) 
NEVADA NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.188, § 180.060 (West 2015)  
NEW HAMPSHIRE N.H. REV. STAT. Ann. § 604-A:2, A:2c, A2d, A:9, A:10 (2015) 
NEW JERSEY N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-2, 14, 15.1, 16, 17 (West 2015)  
NEW MEXICO N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-2, 5, 7 (West 2015) 
NEW YORK N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 717, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 832 (McKinney 2015) 
NORTH CAROLINA N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-450, 453, 455, 456, 498 (West 2015)  
NORTH DAKOTA N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-61-01, 02, § 29-07-01.1 (West 2015)  
OHIO OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.05, OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 120-1-03 (West 2015) 
OKLAHOMA OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A, 1355.14 (West 2015) 
OREGON OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.485, 487, 489 (West 2015) 
PENNSYLVANIA 16 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9960.6, 8 (West 2015) 
RHODE ISLAND R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-15-8, 9, 11 (West 2015) 
SOUTH CAROLINA S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10, 30, 45, 340 (2015) 
SOUTH DAKOTA S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6, 10, 11 (2015) 
TENNESSEE TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-201, 202 (West 2015) 
TEXAS TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 1.051, 26.04, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 79.034 (West 
2015) UTAH UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202 (West 2015) 
VERMONT VT. STAT. ANN. tit.13, § 5201, 5236, 5238 (West 2015) 
VIRGINIA VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159, 161 (West 2015) 
WASHINGTON WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.010, 020 (West 2015) 
WEST VIRGINIA W.VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-16 (West 2015) 
WISCONSIN WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.06, § 977.02, 06, 07 (West 2015) 
WYOMING WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-102, 106, 108 (West 2015) 
  
 
